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ABSTRACT 
In 2014, the United Nations reported that there were 28 cities in the world with 
populations of over 10 million. In 2016, there were 34 of these “megacities” and by the 
year 2030 the UN estimates that there will be 41. As a result, concerns over rapid 
megacity growth have become the focus of U.S. military planners and strategists 
attempting to determine how to best operate in the future megacity environment. In light 
of these demographic shifts and in the face of rapid megacity growth, this research asks 
the question: Do villages still matter? Three case studies were chosen that cover a wide 
geographic range, selecting two contemporary cases in areas with some of the highest 
rates of urbanization. The historic case broadens the geographic scope of the study, but 
also provides historical insights into how each variable influenced success or failure once 
an insurgency occupied the urban terrain. Ultimately, this thesis concludes that in spite of 
megacity growth, if in tomorrow’s conflict the state chooses to take the fight to where the 
insurgent seeks refuge, it will likely occur in the mountains, jungles and deserts, for 
control of villages. 
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The descent into disorder began years before the crisis … the murky 
deaths of political figures in the hinterlands are written off as banditry, 
local blood debts, and revenge killings unremarkable in a society long 
riven by internecine conflict. Seemingly random in pattern, the deaths 
soon become part of the rhythm of everyday life in the country, as 
unexplainable as they are inconsequential. The rising criminality in these 
areas soon block many government services in the area, a fact buried by 
the bureaucracy and invisible to the leaders of the state who believe that 
what they see in the capital is the reality of the state. Villages have no 
officials, taxes go uncollected, and schools have no teachers. By the time 
the state’s police and military units lose the ability to operate in these 
same rural areas, the crisis has matured to an existential crisis for the 
state.1 
—Dr. Craig Whiteside, “The Islamic State and the Return of 
Revolutionary Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, 2016 
 
Traditional rural-based revolutionary warfare has not died in the face of growing 
megacities.  It may, in fact, have become more profound. In the modern era, the crown 
jewel of some states has become its megacity.  It is a source of revenue, an epicenter of 
international trade and in some cases it is more powerful than the state itself.2  Because of 
this, the state will go to great lengths to defend megacities.  But while the growth of these 
urban areas spirals out of control and the state distances itself from the rural populations, 
something else germinates in the shadows.  The rural populations that have not fled 
toward this intoxicating financial prospect are left ignored by the state.  The “haves” and 
the “have-nots” are driven further apart and finding support to resistance is simple, given 
the inaccessible rural terrain and exploitable social and economic disparity.    
                                                 
1 Craig Whiteside, “The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare,” Small Wars Journal 
27, no.5, 743–776, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1208287 
2 Richard Dobbs et al., “Urban world: Mapping the economic power of cities,” McKinsey Global 
Institute, March 2011, http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/urbanization/urban-world-mapping-the-
economic-power-of-cities. 
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The conduct of counterinsurgency in the megacity environment has become the 
focus of U.S. military planners and strategists.3  Concerns over rapid urbanization have 
become recurrent in military planning documents.  It is the emphasis of the 2016 Marine 
Corps Operating Concept; it is alluded to in the titles of best-selling books such as Out of 
the Mountains by David Kilcullen, and is currently closely researched within the 
Department of the Army.4 
Although the implications of modern technology on the battlefield combined with 
overcrowding of urban areas should be a legitimate concern of internal security forces, an 
obsession with these trends may have unintended negative consequences.  Professor 
Craig Whiteside’s observation at the beginning of this introduction is not a century-old 
historical reference; it refers to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a social and 
military wildfire that was ignored in the rural border regions and allowed to smolder 
before blazing up as one of the region’s most dangerous insurgencies.  As the United 
States Government attempts to disengage from fifteen years of central and southwest 
Asian conflict and shift its focus toward other emerging threats, it is critical that the 
lessons learned in the hinterlands are not forgotten.  In tomorrow’s conflict, taking the 
fight to where the insurgent seeks refuge will likely occur in the mountains, jungles and 
deserts for control of the villages.       
This study begins by defining current statistical trends in global urbanization, 
highlighting some of the benefits and drawbacks realized by nation states in relation to 
rapid urbanization and the growth of megacities.  In the background chapter, a brief 
analysis of the evolution of urban-rural relationships highlights Professor Ted Gurr’s 
theory of relative deprivation and its implications on megacity growth.   
                                                 
3 Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong, “Megacities Pros and Cons: The Case for Megacities” 
Parameters 45, no 1, Spring, 2015, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/Spring_2015/5_FelixKevin_WongFre
derick_The%20Case%20for%20Megacities.pdf.  
4 Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, Megacities and 
the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Office of the 
Chief of Staff of the Army, June 2014). 
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Chapter II develops a framework to assess historic and contemporary insurgencies 
in relation to the insurgents’ selection of safe havens and operational environments.  Four 
variables identified by RAND Corporation analysts Angel Rabasa and John Peters 
identify which areas, urban or rural, remain conducive to insurgent or terrorist 
occupation.  Each insurgent organization is further categorized using French 
counterinsurgent David Galula’s strategic insurgent patterns.  This framework will be 
sufficient to consider which future environment, urban, rural or a combination of each 
should be the focus of military planners and strategists. 
The following case studies were chosen after researching which regions of the 
world held the highest rates of urbanization in addition to a persistent insurgent threat.  
Chapter III’s case of the Communist People’s Party – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) 
properly fit the aforementioned criteria.  Chapter IV’s case of Lashkar-e-Taiba was 
selected because of its utilization in David Kilcullen’s book Out of the Mountains. Absent 
from my initial findings however was a case in which an insurgency had chosen one of 
the thirty-four existing megacities as their primary base of operations.  For this reason, 
the final case of the Front de Libération Nationale in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was 
selected.  This allowed for investigation of an urban insurgency in an environment which 
could be closely paralleled with the modern day megacity slum.  
Chapter III presents a contemporary case study analyzing the Philippine megacity 
of Manila and the Communist People’s Party - New People’s Army (CPP-NPA).  This 
case was chosen because it allowed for the examination of an insurgency that remains 
collocated in a nation holding one of the world’s largest megacities.  The CPP-NPA’s 
history within the Philippines coupled with Manila’s ranking on the megacity scale 
allows for the testing of current hypotheses that the insurgents will come “out of the 
mountains” and occupy the megacity environment.      
Chapter IV examines the Indian megacity of Mumbai, and the insurgent 
organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).  This case study was chosen by the strategist David 
Kilcullen in his book Out of the Mountains to underscore his thesis that tomorrow’s 
counterinsurgency battle will occur in the megacity environment.  While his analysis 
detailed the operational aspects of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, this study will explore 
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LeT’s operational areas and support infrastructure.  This case was chosen to help 
determine whether or not Mumbai will serve as a future battlefield against the LeT or if 
counterinsurgency will remain primarily a rural struggle.         
Chapter V, appraises the historical case study of the Front de Libération 
Nationale in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, to expand both the time and geographic scope of 
this study.  Using the framework established in Chapter II, this case points to parallels 
between quarters of Algiers and the modern megacity slum.  In addition, it allows for 
analysis of both French and FLN tactics to better understand which variables led to the 
FLNs overall strategic success, but tactical failure.   
Chapter VI summarizes the findings and offers recommendations to 
counterinsurgency planners and strategists regarding whether or not villages will still 
matter in tomorrow’s counterinsurgency battle.  The findings suggest that both historic 
and contemporary insurgencies have and will continue to rely on ungoverned rural spaces 
for their safe havens and bases of support.  The urban environment is not suitable for 
exclusive occupation and operations by armed insurgents, but only as a location for 




Demographic shifts and the expansion of urban areas along the littoral regions has 
become a worldwide phenomenon.  Megacities are defined as those cities with an 
inhabitant population of over 10 million.5  In 2014 the United Nations reported that there 
were 28 megacities in the world. In 2016 there were 34 and by the year 2030 the UN 
estimates that there will be 41.6  If urbanization continues at this rate, it is estimated that 
by the year 2030, 80% of the world’s population will live in the urban areas.7   
Africa and Asia bear the highest number of existing megacities as well as the 
highest rates of urbanization, which continues to accelerate in response to continued rural 
violence.  Conflict in rural South Sudan in the late 1990s is a good example, where the 
city of Khartoum witnessed a population increase of over 6 million within a few short 
years.8 
Along with megacities there is substantial growth within what McKinsey Global 
Institute (MGI), a leader in global economic trend research, calls “middleweight cities” or 
“cities with populations of between 150,000 and 10 million.”9  They acknowledge that 
while some of these may turn into megacities, the “middleweights” will play a more 
significant role in the future than the existing megacities themselves.10 McKinsey Global 
Institute has found that from a GDP perspective, “407 emerging middleweight cities [are] 
contributing nearly 40 percent of global growth, more than the entire developed world 
and emerging-markets megacities combined.”11  Michael Evans, the former Head of the 
Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Center at the Royal Military College, argues 
                                                 
5 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights,” 2014, 1, 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf.  
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 UN-HABITAT, “The State of the World’s Cities Report 2006/2007,” Earthscan, London, UK, 2006, 
iv. 
8 Ibid., iv. 




that “the point for military strategists to grasp is that, in terms of long-term demographic 
migration, household size and income distribution, it is the maze of middleweight cities 
that are poised to be the key urban sites for the next two decades.”12 
A. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF MEGACITY GROWTH 
Megacities throughout the world are faced with a host of issues. From sewage 
management problems to water contamination, to severe overcrowding, the megacities 
have become a place that was once attractive to the rural population for its high economic 
potential, but have quickly become overcrowded and nearly uninhabitable.  Strategist and 
counter insurgency expert, Dr. David Kilcullen, highlights many of the issues associated 
with rapid urban expansion in his book Out of the Mountains.  He describes Dhaka, the 
capital of Bangladesh, as a place where there is “immense strain on governance: fire, 
ambulance, and health services are over stretched, local government is plagued by 
corruption and inefficiency, and police units have ceded whole districts to gangs and 
organized crime.”13  He points out that in 2012 Dhaka was reported the “least livable city 
on the planet.”14  With all of these issues considered, the environment seems ripe for 
insurgent control.   
It would follow that a heavily strained population, limited governance, and a 
sound narrative for resistance should give insurgents the upper hand in the megacity 
slums.  With conditions so ripe for insurgent control, why haven’t the slums of Dhaka, 
for example, become safe havens and critical areas of influence for insurgents and their 
control?  Even given these conditions, Ansar Bangla, Bangladesh’s most prevalent 
counter state threat with ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), continues to 
choose their safe haven within the Satchhari forest, well outside of Dhaka.15  The reason 
                                                 
12 Michael Evans, “Megacities: The Pros and Cons, The Case Against Megacities,” Parameters 45, 
no. 1 (Spring 2015): 36.  
13 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.  234. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Associated Foreign Press, “Huge weapons cache seized in Bangladesh near India`s border,” Zee 
News India, June 3, 2014, http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/huge-weapons-cache-seized-in-
bangladesh-near-indias-border_937005.html.  
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may be that the structural conditions of the megacity environment maintain high costs to 
armed insurgents when compared to the costs associated with rural occupation.16   
Technology in the world’s megacities is on the leading edge and appears to be 
prevalent even throughout their slums.  In the interest of improving communications and 
productivity throughout the cities, businesses and central governments have taken the 
Internet into even the poorest areas of Jakarta, Delhi and Mumbai in order for people to 
access information, coordinate relief efforts and solicit volunteers.17  With powerlines 
dangerously strung between buildings of which are on the verge of collapse, one would 
expect individual priorities to be different than they seem.  Almost every home appears to 
own a satellite dish and amazingly 34% of households within the slums of Mumbai have 
no toilet, but 63% still own a cellphone.18  While some argue that this interconnectedness 
may prove valuable to insurgent operations, the central government may also be using 
these same technologies to provide oversight into areas less accessible to security forces. 
The implications of information technology in the megacity may arguably favor 
the state in its counterinsurgency efforts.  Princeton University Professor Jacob Shapiro 
and Professor Nils Weidmann at the University of Konstanz in Germany examined the 
effects on insurgent violence before and after improving cellular communications 
infrastructure within populated areas of Iraq.  Two driving factors gave the state the 
upper hand, resulting in an overall decrease in violence.19  The first benefit the state 
maintained was the ability to exploit signals intelligence for targeting purposes.  Shapiro 
                                                 
16 Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School suggests that insurgents choose 
their operational environment and the population determines whether to support the insurgent or the state 
based on a cost benefit analysis. He presents this analysis in the form of the following equation:    
EVi  = (EBi   - ECi ) – (EBg   - ECg)  
or 
Expected Value insurgency = (Expected Benefit insurgency  -  Expected Cost insurgency) – (Expected Benefit 
Government  - Expected Cost Government) 
17 BT Global Services, “Life in megacities: how technology enables interaction and growth,” United 
Kingdom Telecommunications, October 31 2011, https://letstalk.globalservices.bt.com/en/2011/10/life-
megacities-technology-enables-interaction-growth/). 
18 Elliot Hannon, “India’s Census: Lots of Cellphones, Too Few Toilets.” NPR Online, April 12, 2012, 
http://www.npr.org/2012/04/08/150133880/indias-census-lots-of-cellphones-too-few-toilets. 
19 Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, “Is the Phone Mightier Than the Sword? Cellphones and 
Insurgent Violence in Iraq” International Organization 69, no 2, March 2015, 247–274. 
 8 
and Weidmann explain that while the targeting aspects were critical, the second, but 
primary factor causing a reduction in violence was that improved cellular communication 
“enhances voluntary information flow from noncombatants to counterinsurgents by 
reducing the risks of informing.”20  Critical to success however, are the state’s response 
capabilities.  Without a sufficient capability to act or the population’s perception that 
action will be conducted in response to information provided the state cannot exploit 
these benefits.  However, granting that megacity growth has also created a sufficient 
reaction capability, cell phones then significantly reduce the potential costs inherited by a 
civilian choosing to support the central government and increases costs to insurgents for 
occupying the urban terrain. 
Other literature provides a counterargument and proposes that increased 
Information–Communication Technology (ICT), specifically cell phones, give the 
insurgent the upper hand, allowing for increased insurgent coordination and the ability to 
mobilize forces.21  This research while extremely beneficial to the larger technology 
debate has been principally focused on developing nations.  If a developing country lacks 
or is perceived by the population to lack an effective response capability, tips provided 
via cell phone may prove ineffective.         
B. URBAN–RURAL RELATIONSHIP  
The relationship between the urban and rural populations may also be critical to 
understanding the dynamics of future insurgencies.  Throughout history and certainly 
geographically, there are stark differences in the relationships between the rural and 
urban populations depending on their unique stage of evolution.  While researching the 
growth of cities within the United States, author and environmental historian William 
Cronan describes the relationship between the urban and rural zones, stating that “to 
speak of one without the other made little sense.”22  In his book Nature’s Metropolis, 
                                                 
20 Ibid.. 
21 Camber Warren, “Explosive connections? Mass media, social media, and the geography of 
collective violence in African states” Journal of Peace Research, (February 11, 2015): 12, doi: 
10.1177/0022343314558102.  
22 William Cronan, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, (W. W. Norton & Company; 
Reprint edition, 1992), 47. 
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Cronan explains that as a city grows, concentric circles of surrounding rural populations 
form that serve a critical role in supporting sustainment of the city.23  While this may be 
the case in developing countries, stark differences can be observed in other regions.   
Urban-rural relationships throughout Europe have undergone a series of changes 
which began with the Industrial Revolution.  Simin Davoudi, Professor of Environmental 
Policy and Planning at Newcastle University, explains that prior to industrialization, an 
urban area may rely heavily on the rural areas for “the consumption of agricultural 
produce.”24  However, following an industrial era, the rural populations became reliant 
on the urban areas for their economic potential.25  She writes that “today, we seem to be 
witnessing a third phase whereby the urban-rural linkages are moving beyond the single 
one-way exchanges and demonstrate a more complex and dynamic web of 
interdependencies.”26  Today, these dynamics exist because of the modern efficiencies of 
international trade, transportation and communications networks, which may be creating 
both physical and psychological separation between the urban and rural populations.    
In those nations where economic growth is largely based in emerging megacities 
there is growing divergence between the urban and rural populations.  BBC journalist 
Sean Coughman suggests that cities and megacities are becoming the new nation states.  
Central to his argument is that many of these cities are producing a high percentage of the 
nation’s GDP and therefore becoming huge powerbrokers in the respective nation’s 
decision making process.  He states that “there are forecasts for even more urbanization, 
tipping even more of the economic strength into these city states.”27  Of concern 
however, is that this concentration of economic development into the cities and not the 
rural areas may strengthen the insurgent’s ability to highlight dissimilarities and further 
mobilize rural populations as the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) insurgents did against 
                                                 
23 Ibid.,, 50. 
24 Simin Davoudi and Dominic Stead, “Urban-Rural Relationships: an introduction and a brief 
history,” Built Environment 28, no. 4 (2002): 269–277, 5. 
25 Ibid.. 
26 Ibid., 5. 
27 Sean Coughlan, “Are cities the new countries?,” BBC, January 21, 2016 
http://www.bbc.com/news/education-35305586. 
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the Peruvian government.  In this case, the Shining Path exploited what Professor Ted 
Gurr, author on political instability, describes as the theory of relative deprivation.28  
Professor Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation describes a population’s degree of  
satisfaction with one’s state stemming from a balance between their perceived value and 
overall potential when compared to others.29  Gurr suggests that when individuals of a 
society conduct this comparison and a change or discrepancy is noticed, one of two 
feelings is evoked, a sense of innovation or the desire for destruction.30  In today’s case 
of the megacity–rural zone relationship it may be critical to understand where the lines 
exist between the “haves” and the “have-nots.”  Here the rural zones may perceive that 
their potential and overall all value to the state is becoming marginalized as the urban 
population continues to grow in relative strength and prosperity.  
This polarization of the urban and rural populations can also be observed in 
China, the world leader in megacities, where the level of disparity continues to rise 
between the urban and the rural populations.  In 2002, Professor Ding Lu of the National 
University of Singapore described in the China Economic Review his concerns regarding 
an “urban-biased policy mix.”  Lu describes how Chinese policy including restrictions on 
rural-to-urban migration, inflationary taxes on rural income and less access to education 
in the rural areas are causing further disparity between the populations.31  To make 
matters worse and in attempt to limit the growth of these megacities, the Chinese have 
maintained a household registration system that denies the rural population the ability to 
migrate to the urban areas.32  In this situation, under Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, 
the decision by the Chinese government would block the rural population’s ability to 
innovate or focus their desire for improvement in a positive manner, further suggesting 
that the rural population may resort to violence in order to level the perceived 
dissimilarity.   
                                                 
28 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
29 Ibid., 24. 
30 Ibid., 22. 
31 Ding Lu, “Rural–urban income disparity: impact of growth, allocative efficiency, and local growth 
welfare,” China Economic Review 13, 2002, 422.   
32 Lu, “Rural–urban income disparity,” 428.   
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III. FRAMEWORK  
Global demographic shifts combined with the poor living conditions resulting 
from rapid megacity growth do not automatically create armed insurgent safe havens or 
the location of the next counterinsurgency battle.  Other critical variables must exist in 
order for insurgents to determine whether or not an environment will be suitable as an 
operational area, safe haven, training area or simply as the location of a high pay-off 
attack.  RAND Corporation Analysts Angel Rabasa and John Peters discussed insurgent 
operational areas exclusively in the paper Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and 
Reducing Terrorism Risks.33  Here they argue that four variables must exist in order for 
an area to be conducive to insurgent occupation.  Rabasa and Peters state that “(1) 
adequacy of infrastructure and operational access, (2) availability of sources of income, 
(3) favorable demographics, and (4) invisibility” are all required in order for an insurgent 
organization to successfully occupy space and conduct operations.34   
In addition to the physical variables required for insurgent occupation of an 
environment, it is also critical for the counterinsurgent to understand the opposing 
insurgent’s strategy.  U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine states that 
“counterinsurgents have to determine not only their opponents’ motivation but also the 
approach being used to advance the insurgency.”35  Bard O’Neill, professor at the 
National War College in Washington, DC, emphasizes this requirement, stating that “it is 
especially important to distinguish among forms of warfare because they not only differ 
in terms of their purposes, targets, activities, and scale of organization but also with 
regard to the problems they pose for, and the requirements they place on, both sides.”36  
French counterinsurgent, David Galula dedicates a chapter of his book, 
                                                 
33 Angel Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, RAND 
Report MG-561-AF (Santa Monica, CA, 2007).  
34 Ibid., xvi.  
35 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM-3-24), Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of 
the Army, 2006, 1–5. 
36 O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2005), 26. 
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Counterinsurgency Warfare to describing the “strategic patterns” that insurgencies have 
followed throughout history, implying that a thorough understanding of these patterns 
will assist the counterinsurgent in developing a logical plan.  Although he acknowledges 
that variation is inevitable, he believes two primary patterns have emerged throughout 
history: the “Orthodox Pattern” and the “Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern.”37      
A. INSURGENT STRATEGIES 
Granting that variation from these strategic patterns is inevitable, this research 
will categorize each insurgent case study into one of Galula’s two identified insurgent 
patterns.  The first pattern he identifies is the “Orthodox Pattern” or “Communist” style 
of insurgency.38  Galula states that because this pattern consists of more than just 
overthrowing a government or occupying power and it focuses on a “complete 
Communist transformation of the country,” it may be “at best a slow, painstaking 
process.”39  He explains that the first step in this pattern is the creation of a Party and the 
organization of a large united front.40  The leadership will emerge from students and 
intellectuals, while the mass base is typically made up of the proletariat and peasant 
class.41  Once it has developed the mass base the insurgent organization resorts to 
guerrilla warfare as it continues to organize, build popular support and military 
capability.  The insurgency, in this pattern attempts movement warfare, where the 
insurgent’s regular army directly confronts the counterinsurgent, overthrowing the state 
and assuming political ownership.42 
Galula’s “Orthodox Pattern” is most often associated with Mao Zedong or Che 
Guevara, but the emphasis on which environment to operate in, urban or rural, has 
changed in an almost cyclical manner.  Following Mao’s success in 1949, rural based 
                                                 
37 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 30–39. 
38 Ibid., 30. 
39 Ibid., 31. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 30–31. 
42 Ibid., 32–39.   
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insurgencies seemed to take primacy in the minds of revolutionaries.  However, 
following the death of Che Guevara, during the 1970s and into the 1980s, the idea of the 
urban guerrilla became extremely popular.  Revolutionary author, Abraham Guillen 
wrote in his book published in 1973, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, that “the center 
of operations should never be in the mountains or in the villages, but in the largest cities 
where the population suffices to form the army of the revolution.”43  This was short lived 
as practitioners quickly realized the severe implications of occupying the urban terrain 
without proper analysis of the state’s capabilities.  Professor Anthony Joes of St. Joseph’s 
University, highlights the results of insurgent decisions to occupy urban environments, 
stating in his book Urban Guerrilla Warfare that “nowhere in the 20th century has urban 
guerrilla warfare achieved an unambiguous success.”44  It seems that in the modern era 
however, attention has shifted once again toward the threat of the “urban guerrilla.”   
Galula’s second insurgent pattern is the “Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern” or 
“Shortcut.”  In this pattern, Galula explains that the insurgency skips the first steps 
associated with the “Orthodox Pattern,” and hopes that blind terrorism will expedite the 
organization’s objective of gaining popularity.45  The second step, he states is “selective 
terrorism,” which will be conducted to “isolate the counterinsurgent from the masses, to 
involve the population in the struggle, and to obtain as a minimum its passive 
complicity.”46  Once the insurgency has gained passive support from the population, it 
continues mostly in line with the “Orthodox Pattern.”  However, one difference requiring 
emphasis is that the “short-cut” pattern typically places little emphasis on creation of a 
governing entity.47  Analysts Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki of RAND Corporation 
warn in their study How Insurgencies End that “broad terror campaigns by insurgents 
                                                 
43 Abraham Guillén, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham 
Guillén (New York: Morrow, 1973), 237. 
44 Anthony Joes, Urban Guerrilla Warfare (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 157.   
45 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfar, 39. 
46 Ibid., 40. 
47 Ibid., 39–40. 
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correlate with insurgent defeat … qualitative analysis shows that the use of indiscriminate 
terror often is a sign of overconfidence or, conversely, of weakness.”48  
B. ADEQUACY OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL ACCESS  
Rabasa and Peter’s first variable, adequacy of infrastructure and operational 
access, refers to the insurgent’s ability to use existing transportation, banking and 
communications infrastructure in order to facilitate operations.49  They explain that a 
balance is required where insurgents wish to enjoy the undeveloped areas for their 
inaccessibility by the state security apparatus, but require a certain level of infrastructure 
to remain operational.50  Because this balance is difficult to achieve, case studies 
discussed in upcoming chapters will demonstrate how support infrastructure is typically 
not concentrated within one environment, but maintains a balance between both urban 
and rural, often reaching outside state borders.    
When referring to operational access, Rabasa suggests that insurgents must also 
have “reasonably easy access to terrorists’ desired attack venues.”51  Although 
improvements in global transportation and communication have assisted insurgents with 
extending their operational reach, a balance between the location of their safe haven and 
their attack location is required in the interest of maintaining a persistent presence.  
Terrorist attacks designed to gain attention or build popular support are most often 
conducted in the urban areas.52  However, the location of the attack does not necessarily 
indicate the location of the larger insurgency.  By increasing the presence of military 
forces within the location of the attack, the counterinsurgent may mistakenly play into the 
insurgent’s strategy.  Revolutionary philosopher Regis Debray highlights the importance 
of a balanced approach from the insurgent perspective, stating that:  
                                                 
48 Ben Connable and Martin C Libicki. How Insurgencies End, Report MG-965-MCIA, (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), xvii. 
49 Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories, 16.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Donald W. Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy 
in Southeast Asia (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 31. 
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City terrorism cannot assume any decisive role, and it entails certain 
dangers of a political order. But if it is subordinate to the fundamental 
struggle, the struggle in the countryside, it has, from the military point of 
view, a strategic value; it immobilizes thousands of enemy soldiers, it ties 
up most of the repressive mechanism in unrewarding tasks of protection: 
factories, bridges, electric generators, public buildings, highways, oil pipe-
lines—these can keep busy as much as three quarters of the army.53   
C. AVAILABILITY OF INCOME 
Availability of income, Rabasa and Peter’s second variable, is tantamount to 
success in most insurgencies.  Rabasa and Peters highlight that income is typically either 
sourced from the trade of commodities (i.e., drugs, oil, human trafficking) or from the 
taxation of the local population.54  This can be observed in Afghanistan where the 
Taliban enjoy virtual control over the Pakistan-Afghan border region.  From here they 
receive income from third-party sponsors as well as proceeds from the opium trade, sale 
of stolen vehicles and human trafficking to facilitate operations.55  Of interest are 
Connable and Libicki’s quantitative findings, that “both low income [areas] and low 
urbanization imply an advantage greater than 2:1 for the insurgent.”56  This may be a 
result of the insurgent’s ability to better leverage control over a population that does not 
have the means to relocate or escape taxation. 
As technology improves and spreads across the globe, even the rural-based 
insurgency has almost immediate access to a network of funds. Steve Barber of Norwich 
University states that today’s “interconnectedness between these various financing 
sources … has the effect of linking ‘money, geography, politics, arms, and tactics’ to 
create a devastatingly powerful ‘alternative’ or ‘underground’ economy.”57  With these 
improvements, the rural guerrilla is no longer cut off from the world writ large; he can 
                                                 
53 Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?: Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin 
America (New York: MR Press, 1967), 75.  
54 Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories, 17.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ben Connable and Martin C Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 48. 
57 Steve Barber, “The New Economy of Terror: The Financing of Islamist Terrorism,” Global Security 
Issues 2, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 3.  
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maximize the benefits of the ungoverned terrain while effectively sourcing income from 
around the globe. 
D. FAVORABLE DEMOGRAPHICS  
Of all of the named variables, favorable demographics and social characteristics 
may play the most significant role.  Favorable demographics affect an insurgency’s 
ability to utilize existing infrastructure, acquire income and remain invisible while 
conducting operations.  The complexity of the megacity presents unique challenges 
regarding demographics for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.  While 
seemingly disorganized the slums growing along the periphery of existing megacities are 
in reality highly segregated by socio-ethnic class. Army Officers, Kenneth Neilson and 
Robert Thomson, state in their Naval Postgraduate School thesis, that “the dynamics that 
are built within these cultural communities create an atmosphere that is extremely 
difficult to infiltrate and influence if one is an ‘outsider’ … the socio-ethnic differences 
occurring in these environments create a natural demographic boundary.”58  While 
extremely difficult for foreign penetration, this boundary may serve in favor of the 
counterinsurgent. Bard O’Neill, author on insurgency and terrorism, highlights that 
“where the population is small and concentrated, it is easier for the government to control 
the people and sever its links with the guerillas.  When most of the people live in cities, 
the situation does not appear as favorable to insurgent movements as when the population 




                                                 
58 Kenneth Neilson and Robert Thomson, “Strategies for Countering Terrorist Safe Havens (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 13. 
59 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2005), 78. 
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E. INVISIBILITY  
The element of invisibility remains critical for insurgent success and may be 
problematic in the megacity environment.  Before continuing, however, it must be 
acknowledged that invisibility is dependent on the subject state’s ability to affect the 
insurgent should they become visible.60  Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval 
Postgraduate School discusses the variable of “invisibility” at length, highlighting that the 
insurgent only needs invisibility if the state has the means to affect them.  An insurgent 
finding safe haven across a border or within an ungoverned region for example, may not 
need to remain invisible if the threatened country does not have the political will or 
military means to attack.61  While the megacity may provide significant infrastructure for 
exploitation by insurgents, the ability to move men, weapons and equipment in a manner 
that is unseen or “invisible” remains much more difficult.  In the 1970s Che Guevara 
cautioned future guerrillas that while the benefits of the urban terrain may be great, he 
warned that “the risks and consequences of exposure are tremendous.”62   
F. CONCLUSION 
Research suggests that insurgent organizations around the globe choose 
operational areas on the basis of a few variables.  Critical to the insurgent’s selection of 
an operational environment are the need for infrastructure, sources of income, favorable 
demographics and invisibility.63  In addition, the insurgent strategy of the leadership or 
sponsor must also be considered.  While the list of variables described is not exhaustive, 
they provide a framework to examine both historical and contemporary insurgencies in 
relation to the megacity environment.  This will help counterinsurgency strategists 
determine under what conditions the next counterinsurgency battle will be fought. 
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IV. CASE STUDY #1—NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY, MANILA, 
PHILIPPINES 
Growing in the periphery of Manila’s megacity environment, as of 2016, the 
Communist People’s Party – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) shows no sign of shifting 
its insurgent strategy into the megacity.  An aggregate of the following evidence suggests 
that Manila’s urban environment does not serve as suitable for long-term occupation of 
armed insurgents, rather primarily for the promotion of its political entities and as a stage 
for potential high profile attacks.  The existing security apparatus of Manila coupled with 
its social structure make the environment inhospitable to the “urban guerilla.”  
Additionally, the CPP-NPA’s insurgent strategy and exploitation of the ungoverned rural 
areas have allowed them access to infrastructure, income, and the favorable 
demographics required to sustain operations, all without risking exclusive occupation of 
the urban environment.   
A. ORGANIZATION OF MANILA  
In 2016, Manila, the capital of the Philippines, was ranked the fifth largest urban 
area in the world.64  Metro Manila bears a population of approximately 24 million and is 
increasing at a rate of 1.7 percent each year.65  The result of this rapid urban growth has 
made Manila one of the most densely populated cities on the planet.66             
Located on the western edge of the island of Luzon, Manila is archetypal of the 
“average” megacity.  Its developed urban core remains dwarfed in relation to the vast 
expanse of slums.  At first glance, the conglomeration of shanty towns throughout Manila 
appear to be highly disorganized, but are in reality broken down into smaller settlements. 
These settlements are populated mostly by rural migrants with shared ethnic origin or 
                                                 
64 Demographia, “World Urban Areas,” April 2016, retrieved from http://www.demographia.com/db-
worldua.pdf. 
65 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World 
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linguistic background and acceptance into them is largely dependent on their shared 
identity.67   
Just above the informal social organization of the settlement is Manila’s smallest 
form of organized government, known as the barangay.68  There are over one thousand 
barangays in Manila, each of which possesses its own elected leader and formal council.  
This traditional form of governance emphasizes the empowerment of local elders and has 
underpinned central government access.  The barangays possess a unique form of conflict 
resolution known as the Barangay Justice System, recognized as lawful by the national 
government.69  This system has proven to be an effective form of decentralized, local 
dispute resolution and remains a critical element toward thwarting insurgent occupation.  
Former U.S. Air Force Officer and adviser at Colorado College, Joseph Derdzinski 
describes the benefits of this informal organization, stating that “one net result is that 
most urban settlements are relatively closed communities.  An outside settler would be 
noticed fairly quickly and may be reluctant to settle in a community where he has no 
logical filial connection.”70      
B. PROBLEMS WITH GROWTH IN MANILA  
Manila has no shortage of problems. Analogous to other megacities, Manila has 
attracted a significant population of poor rural citizens, all of whom hope to benefit from 
the city’s economic growth.  This rate of urbanization, which now has almost 50% of the 
Philippine population living in cities,71 has also created a network of slums leaving 
Manila plagued with corruption and extremely vulnerable to disease and natural disaster.   
                                                 
67 Joseph L. Derdzinski, “Rapid Urban Settlement, Violence, and the Democratizing State: Toward an 
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70 Derdzinski, “Rapid Urban Settlement,” 8. 
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One example among many is Manila’s struggle with solid waste management. 
Every day, 1100 tons of human and solid waste is released into the city’s waterways, 
causing significant flooding and contamination issues.72  These issues are only 
compounded by the approximately 20 typhoons that hit the Philippines each year, further 
propagating huge migrations of homeless and displaced people into the city.73  This 
coupled with income disparity being the highest of the Asian countries; one would 
assume that the urban environment would remain ripe for insurgent control.74 
C. BENEFITS OF GROWTH IN MANILA   
While the rapid urbanization of Manila may have created significant problems 
along its periphery, the benefits of its economic prosperity should also be considered.  
President Rodrigo Duterte has continued to focus much of the Philippines’ economic 
growth on healthcare, education and structural reform, all of which he hopes will have a 
significant effect on reducing poverty.  In 2015, the World Bank stated that “sustaining 
this level of high growth and making it inclusive over the long term will enable the 
country to eradicate poverty and boost shared prosperity within a generation.”75 
In addition to refocusing government programs on improving the social welfare of 
its inhabitants, Manila’s rapid economic growth has allowed for the creation of a 
sufficient security apparatus.  Although corruption and historical distrust between the 
Philippine Army and the police continues to strain their relationship, the United States 
Army Special Forces has made significant progress building capability within the 
Filipino ranks.  In 2013, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) came out from its 
rural bases and attempted to sack the city of Zamboanga. In reaction, the Philippine 
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Police Special Action Force alongside the Army Light Reaction Regiment or “Army 
Rangers,” effectively eliminated the threat and returned the city’s control back to its local 
police.76   
However, the MNLF only serves as one of many counter-state threats. Re-
establishing itself in the shadows of India’s economic expansion is the Communist 
People’s Party – New People’s Army, which continues to develop throughout the 
Philippines vast rural regions.  
Adhering to its communist roots, the CPP-NPA has followed the orthodox pattern 
of insurgency.  It has created a party base from the rural peasantry, attempted to subvert 
social order to promote political struggles and continues to build a guerrilla force intent 
on surrounding the urban areas before attempting a ‘war of movement.’77  
Throughout the 1980s, the CPP-NPA attempted an urban approach in both the 
city of Davao and Manila. Foreign policy author F.A. Mediansky wrote in 1986, that 
“Davao [had] reportedly become the NPA laboratory for urban insurgency, with the aim 
of building up experience and tactical doctrine which [could] be applied in other 
cities.”78  This was short lived however, as the NPA quickly realized the structural 
problems associated with operating in the urban environment.  With little to no outside 
state sponsorship at the time and Manila’s wealthiest population departing the city to 
avoid taxation by insurgents, the NPA’s effectiveness dried up as they were forced back 
into the surrounding villages to reconsolidate.     
Instead, the CPP-NPA now focuses much of its effort on controlling the 
ungoverned villages scattered throughout the rural areas.  The CPP-NPA has deliberately 
expanded its influence in these areas through the use of armed mobile propaganda units 
called Sandatahang Yunit Pamporpanda (SYPs) and as of 2006, has penetrated 70 of the 
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79 Philippine provinces.79  Once established in these provinces and villages, the CPP-
NPA capitalizes on perceived relative deprivation to build a base of support by providing 
those services not delivered by the central government.  By building rural bases and 
opening schools the CPP-NPA are indoctrinating young children into the communist 
mindset, leaving the country yet another generation of state resistance.       
D. COMMUNIST PEOPLE’S PARTY – NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY 
1. Insurgent Strategy 
The Communist People’s Party (CPP) and its armed or guerrilla faction, the New 
People’s Army (NPA), were founded on Mao Zedong’s birthday in 1968 by Jose Maria 
Sison, a prominent activist and member of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas or PKP.80  
Underpinning the CPP-NPA’s ideology is to overthrow the Philippine Government, expel 
the United States from the region and build a new democratic government under the 
leadership of the working class. 
The CPP-NPA’s size has fluctuated throughout history as they have moved back 
and forth between phases of insurgency.  At its formation, the NPA-CPP consisted of 
only sixty combatants and a handful of leftist students, but quickly gained support 
growing to over twenty-five thousand in the mid-1980s.81  In 2015 while on the strategic 
defensive, the NPA-CPP strength was estimated at 4,443 active members and continues 
to pose a significant threat to the Philippine government.82 
2. Infrastructure and Operational Access  
While aspects of Manila’s urban infrastructure have proven suitable for resistance 
elements, evidence suggests that the CPP-NPA is far from shifting toward a strategy of 
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armed urban insurgency.  As Debray suggested in 1967, they have kept the urban 
segments “subordinate to the fundamental struggle, the struggle in the countryside.”83   
The maze of congested streets, flurry of tricycles and crowded jeepneys84 proves 
to be beneficial for the NPA’s access to attack venues, but makes long-term occupation 
much more difficult.  The social structure of Manila only allows small pockets of safe 
havens, and the dense population provides a significant number of police informants to 
quickly reveal the insurgents’ locations.85  Derdzinski states that “instead of using the 
squatter settlements for preoperational planning, the tendency is for them to use the 
motels and pension houses that are more common in the established, older settlement 
areas … [those] family-owned establishments that shun electronic payments and, in 
return for cash, provide some anonymity for the residents.”86  Although these 
establishments provide a level of secrecy, the insurgent’s proverbial clock begins ticking 
as soon as they occupy.       
3. Sources of Income 
By coupling the benefits of the resource-rich rural environment with the 
Philippines’ strong international trade infrastructure, the CPP-NPA has no shortage of 
income.  After 1976, material and financial support from China had diminished and the 
CPP-NPA was forced to resort to other forms of fundraising.87  Today, in addition to 
support from global front companies, the organization’s primary source of income comes 
from ‘revolutionary taxes’ and ‘permits to campaign, most of which is sourced from the 
rural environment.’88   
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In 2011, the ungoverned rural zones of the Philippines produced $6.2 billion USD 
in natural resources, accounting for 2.8% of the Philippine GDP.89  These areas however, 
are becoming relatively less important to the central government when compared to 
Manila’s contribution, which makes up for 37.2% of the nation’s GDP.90  While 
diminishing in importance to the central government, these reserves of metals such as 
copper, chromite and gold provided the CPP-NPA with USD $450,000 per month or 
USD $5.4 million dollars annually in ‘revolutionary taxes’ from a single province.91   
4. Favorable Demographics  
One benefit of the CPP-NPA’s revolutionary approach is that they do not select 
their members based on religion, sex, age or ethnic background.  With a nationalist 
ideology rather than ethnic identity, guerrillas enjoy anonymity amongst not one 
demographic, but from the labyrinth of people transiting throughout Manila.  This proves 
beneficial to the guerrilla when moving across the urban environment, but still presents 
difficulties for long-term armed occupation.   
The familial boundaries throughout the slums have created a natural social 
structure which has made invisibility much more difficult.  Instead, the CPP has resorted 
to using the demographics of the urban environment mostly for limited duration kinetic 
activity92 and the recruitment of future cadre from urban educational institutions.93  
In the rural areas and villages, however, NPA guerrillas have many factors in their 
favor.  Even though the tribal dispute resolution process remains similar, the central 
government has little access in these rugged areas which has left the villages vulnerable 
                                                 
89 Calculations were conducted using the World Bank’s most recent(2011) estimate of total natural 
resources (% of GDP) multiplied by its 2011 total GDP.   
90 Benjamin de la Peña, “No, Mareng Winnie, Metro Manila is not the ‘paborito’; it is the ‘tagasalo,’” 
InterAksyon News Online, January 19, 2015, http://www.interaksyon.com/business/103332/benjamin-de-la-
pena--no-mareng-winnie-metro-manila-is-not-the-paborito-it-is-the-tagasalo.  
91 Greg Macabenta, “Duterte and the CPP-NPA protection racket,” Asian Journal, June 25 2016, 
http://asianjournal.com/editorial/duterte-and-the-cpp-npa-protection-racket/.    
92 U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003,” 24 October 2016, 
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/.  
93 Francis Doming, “Explaining the Sustainability of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New 
People’s Army” Small Wars Journal, October, 4 2013,5-6, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/explaining-
the-sustainability-of-the-communist-party-of-the-philippines-new-people%E2%80%99s-army.  
 26 
to CPP-NPA control.94  Here the CPP-NPA rarely resorts to fear based tactics for 
recruitment activities, but capitalizes on relative deprivation between the urban and rural 
populations.  The CPP-NPA highlights shared economic disparity, unresolved land 
disputes and the central government’s lack of economic inclusion to build their base of 
support.       
5. Invisibility 
The villages scattered throughout the mountainous hinterlands have provided the 
NPA a sufficient level of invisibility.  By splitting the organization into smaller elements, 
implementing strict operational security measures and extensively screening each recruit, 
the CPP-NPA has successfully remained “invisible” to government forces and avoided 
rural counterinsurgent efforts.  Assistant Professor Francis Domingo of De La Salle 
University states that in the rural areas “the support of the masses transforms into a vital 
reserve of manpower and logistics for guerrilla forces, an effective communication 
system between commands, superior combat intelligence network that enables the CPP-
NPA to prepare for potential attacks and most importantly, a ‘screen’ that denies 
government security forces from gathering intelligence on the CPP-NPA’s capabilities 
and intentions.”95  Given these favorable conditions, the CPP-NPA shows no need to risk 
armed occupation of the megacity and continues to “[maintain] a limited presence in key 
cities around the Philippines.”96     
When the CPP-NPA does enter the urban environment, the organization restricts 
its armed activities to limited duration strikes such as assassinations or kidnappings 
before seeking safe havens outside the city.  These kidnapping and assassination teams, 
known as “sparrow teams”97 allow the CPP-NPA the ability to exploit the publicity 
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advantages associated with the city while enjoying the safety of the rural environment for 
its level of security and operational support.       
E. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the midst of a rapidly urbanizing Philippines, and even with almost 50% of the 
Filipino population now living in cities, the CPP-NPA shows little sign of shifting toward 
an urban form of insurgency.  The CPP-NPA has previously attempted urban initiatives 
and learned from the structural drawbacks associated armed urban occupation. More 
likely is that the CPP-NPA will continue to use the urban environment as a supporting 
effort for recruitment activities, maintenance of non-violent political parties as well as a 
stage for high-profile attacks.  While on the strategic defensive, the CPP-NPA will likely 
continue to rebuild its rural support base, exploiting ungoverned mining resources for 
financial gain while using peace-talks as a temporary shield to facilitate further build-up 
and organizational efforts.        
From a counterinsurgency strategy perspective, it will be critical that the U.S. 
Armed Forces continue its partnership with Philippine security forces, emphasizing 
access into the rural environment and the extension of government resources to those 
outside the megacity sphere of influence.  Reinforcing the security apparatus in regions of 
high natural resource production will reduce CPP-NPA income, attract corporate mining 
industries that have since departed due to insurgent taxation and assist in promoting a 
more positive urban-rural zone relationship.   
In order to facilitate security within Manila, government entities should focus on 
three tasks.  First, partnership and interoperability within Manila’s police forces will be 
critical as militarization of the megacity environment may have a limited effect on CPP-
NPA fundraising, training, or rural growth.  Second, improving host nation intelligence 
collection within the city will limit insurgent access to vulnerable, underprivileged 
settlements and will limit the impression of an over excessive central government 
presence.  Continued efforts to make economic growth inclusive throughout the country 
will pay long-term security dividends.  Improving national infrastructure throughout the 
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Philippines will limit the CPP-NPAs ability to exploit elements of relative deprivation 
and may further improve relationships between urban and rural populations.   
 29 
V. CASE STUDY #2—LASHKAR-E-TAIBA, MUMBAI, INDIA 
The 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, are described in detail by author and strategist 
David Kilcullen, intending to support his prediction that future counterinsurgencies will 
be fought in the megacity environment.98 Although Mumbai serves as home to a 
significant level of organized crime, poverty and a maze of urban sprawl, the urban 
environment there is not preferable for the long-term occupation of armed insurgents.   
Mumbai’s robust financial growth has allowed for the creation of a sufficient 
security apparatus.  Although it has allowed for periodic attacks, Indian security forces 
have proven extremely effective in thwarting insurgent occupation of the urban 
environment.  Finally, with a safe haven provided behind the borders of Pakistan, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba enjoys all of the variables required to source its insurgent operations. 
Abandoning its current safe haven for urban Mumbai may place the LeT or other 
revolutionaries at a structural disadvantage.    
A. ORGANIZATION OF MUMBAI   
In 2016, Mumbai was rated the sixth largest megacity in world.99  Located on the 
western shores of India along the Arabian Sea, greater Mumbai counts a population of 
over 22,885,000 and serves as the country’s commercial and economic capital.100  While 
Mumbai continues to be the economic powerhouse for the nation, the city possesses the 
same benefits and drawbacks of its megacity brethren.       
B. PROBLEMS WITH GROWTH IN MUMBAI 
Population growth and poor urban planning have plagued Mumbai with a number 
of significant issues.  Beginning as a fishing village and then becoming a significant hub 
for international trade under British control in the 1800s, the focus of Mumbai’s growth 
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remained largely concentrated on its urban core. The fringes of Mumbai, immediately 
outside its super rich financial districts, have become besieged with overpopulated slums, 
occupied by those seeking a sliver of Mumbai’s economic prospect.   
Most notable is Mumbai’s “Dharavi” slum, the setting for the 2008 film Slumdog 
Millionaire, and is often referred to as the world’s largest slum.101  Dharavi, which has 
existed since the British colonial era, has a population of 1 million or 18,000 people per 
acre.102   
As Indian agriculture wanes in the shadow of commercial industry, the Dharavi 
slum continues to attract large numbers of poor, rural, Hindu and Muslim migrants.  In 
2007, The Economist explained the continued rural flight into Mumbai stating that “their 
only hope is to move to the cities.  It is an echo of what happened in medieval Europe, 
when moving to a city was for many an escape from serfdom. Stadtluft macht frei (City 
air sets you free), said the Germans.”103  This steady flow of illegal settlers have created 
an extremely diverse population of which are subjected to some of the worst conditions 
imaginable.        
It is estimated that within a single block there are only 15–20 toilets and water is 
only obtained during set times from a select few spigots.104  This lack of sanitation 
infrastructure has further propagated health complications among its citizens and would 
seem to serve as a critical vulnerability for insurgent exploitation of relative deprivation.  
The question remains however, why has the Dharavi slum not, in the center of Mumbai, 
become an insurgent base for resistance as some late strategists conspire?        
In addition to health and sanitation issues, Mumbai is rife with organized crime.  
Shankar Pratap Singh of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute outlines the 
modus operandi of these criminal organizations, stating that “they are engaged in such 
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felonious activities as illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, the use of violence and 
extortion, acts of corruption, trafficking in women and children, illicit manufacturing of 
and trafficking in firearms, environmental crime, credit card fraud, computer related 
crime, illegal trafficking of stolen vehicles, industrial espionage and sabotage, maritime 
piracy, etc.”105  Missing from their intentions is their desire to overthrow the Indian 
government.  Singh goes on to state that “the purpose of organized crime in India, as 
elsewhere in the world, is monetary gain and this is what makes it a formidable force in 
today’s socio-political set up.”106  With these goals in mind, the gangs of Mumbai choose 
to operate at a level that remains under the Indian government’s allowable threshold of 
violence.  Where an insurgency often times intends to provoke government response, 
violence conducted by criminal organizations only reinforces its tactical aims, often times 
without provoking state retaliation.     
C. BENEFITS OF GROWTH IN MUMBAI  
India’s economic growth and stability has thwarted insurgent occupation of its 
cities, specifically Mumbai.  As Professor David Satterthwaite and colleagues at the 
London School of Economics points out, “many development professionals see 
urbanization as a problem.  Yet, no nation has prospered without urbanization and there is 
no prosperous nation that is not predominantly urban.”107  Although Satterthwaite 
highlights this in his research on the implications of urbanization on food production, the 
same holds true for the development of India’s security apparatus.   
Since 2013, India has been on its way to having one of the four largest militaries 
in the world.108  In addition to its 1.3 million man army, India has created a number of 
para-military and special police forces to address its internal threats.  Of note is the 
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National Security Guards, a 7,500-man elite anti-terrorist contingency force that has been 
tasked with internal security as its core mission.  Creating forces such as the National 
Security Guards has allowed the Indian military to focus primarily on external threats 
propagated from the Kashmir region and leave the police and other security forces to 
focus on its internal threats.  Christine Fair of the RAND Corporation states that “India 
has promulgated a number of these paramilitary forces to shield the Indian army from 
‘aid to civil operations’ and to minimize the involvement of the army in law 
enforcement.”109  While this structure has not eliminated the insurgent threat throughout 
the country, especially in the Kashmir region, it has proven to be effective in limiting 
insurgent occupation of the urban environment.     
During instances where insurgents attempted to hold ground within an Indian city, 
Indian security forces were successful in using traditional cordon-and-search methods to 
root them out.  Fair describes the success of these tactics during Operation Bluestar, 
where Indian security forces fought a growing insurgency within the city of Srinagar:  
The typical operation would begin between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. when 
BSF troops (typically in battalion strength) cordoned off an area. At 6:00 
a.m. the troops would call out the males, assemble them in a large area 
(e.g., a sports ground, a mosque compound, or a street), and segregate 
them by age. Identification parades would take place throughout the 
morning and afternoon and each typically involved parading the male 
population one by one before a hooded informant ... The Indians’ ability to 
break the back of the militancy in Srinagar, “the nerve center” of the revolt 
in 1989–1992, is attributed to these unrelenting cordon-and-search 
operations.110   
However, in 2008 a series of attacks in Mumbai brought into question whether or 
not the future safe havens of armed insurgents would be in the megacity.    
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D. LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 
On November 26th, 2008 members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) moved from their 
bases in Pakistan into the streets of Mumbai to conduct an attack that remains in the 
memory of most Indians, as 9/11 is to most Americans.  While the attack may have been 
conducted in order to “maximize publicity,”111 it supported the LeT’s goal of asserting 
control over the disputed Kashmir region, with long-term hopes of establishing an 
Islamic Caliphate throughout India.112   
1. Insurgent Strategy  
Lashkar-e-Taiba is a violent extremist Sunni organization that follows the Ahle-
Hadith interpretation of Islam, aligns some of its goals with the government of Pakistan 
and in 2001 was designated by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization.113  
While LeT appears to follow elements of Galula’s definition of a “Bourgeois-Nationalist 
Pattern” insurgency, their strong organizational backing diverges them slightly from the 
given construct.  Galula describes this pattern as typically consisting of “a small group of 
men, with no broad organization to back them.”  Although LeT maintains a strong 
organizational backing, their strategy and lack of post conflict preparation more closely 
follows the definition.  Galula describes that “the goal of the insurgent in this case is 
generally limited to the seizure of power; post insurgency problems, as secondary 
preoccupations, are shelved for the time being.”114  Granting this deviation, LeT uses 
“random terrorism, bombings, arson, assassinations, conducted in as spectacular a fashion 
as possible, by concentrated, coordinated, and synchronized waves.”115  Although LeT 
maintains a strong organizational backing, its tactics are precisely in suit with Galula’s 
definition.  While the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and again in 2011 appeared to be 
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merely blind terrorism, they were all done with the intent to “focus attention and attract 
latent support.”116  
2. Infrastructure and Operational Access  
Lashkar-e-Taiba maintains a multi-faceted and effective support infrastructure. 
Although the LeT headquarters is located outside of Lahore, Pakistan, it occupies much 
of the ungoverned rural areas of Mohmand and Bajaur Agency as well.  Here they have 
developed training areas, madrassas, schools and recruiting stations which serve as a base 
of support to launch continued attacks against India and Afghanistan.117  In 2008, while 
planning for the Mumbai attacks, Zarrar Shah, the LeT’s chief computer expert first 
sought safe haven in the northern mountains of Pakistan before moving to his temporary 
urban safe house.118   
With their primary operational area and support infrastructure within the borders 
of Pakistan, and the urban terrain of Mumbai being unsuitable and unnecessary for long-
term armed occupation, the LeT’s only hurdle was access to their desired attack 
objective. Bill Roggio, an editor for The Long War Journal stated that “the Mumbai 
attack is something different … one of the more intriguing aspects of the attack is how 
the teams entered Mumbai.”119  Careful planning supported by non-violent, urban-based 
entities and the exploitation of Mumbai’s poorly secured fishing port coupled with the 
LeT’s use of technology to support communication allowed its guerrillas almost seamless 
access to its targets.      
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3. Sources of Income  
Lashkar-e-Taiba maintains a plethora of fundraising activities and enjoys no 
shortage of income.  It is estimated that LeTs annual budget is over $50 million.120  
Boston University Professor Jessica Stern even suggests that the LeT’s income has 
reached such a level that the organization has considered opening its own bank.121   
Fundraising activities such as proceeds from legitimate businesses, collection of 
Islamic taxes and income from hospitals, schools and medical facilities only account for a 
portion of the funds collected by LeT.122  Ryan Clarke, an analyst of the Strategic Studies 
Institute reports that “in addition to soliciting donations from charities, non-governmental 
organizations, and overseas Pakistanis, LeT has branched out and diversified its sources 
of funding, thus making its financial pipeline less vulnerable to a decapitating strike.”123  
Adding to the complexity of LeT’s financial infrastructure, Stanford University’s 
Institute for International Studies illuminates Pakistan’s current relationship with LeT, 
stating that “in addition to ISI support, LeT also receives funds from the Pakistani 
civilian government.  This money is usually directed through LeT-run schools and 
hospitals.”124   
4. Favorable Demographics  
One difficulty Lashkar-e-Taiba faces with basing in Mumbai as well as other 
Indian cities is its demographics.  In 2011, the Indian census reported that India’s 
population was 14.23% Muslim, a distant second to the Hindu majority of 79.80%.125  
While this population of Muslim inhabitants allows the LeT access to a select few urban 
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sympathizers, religious faith alone does not allow for long term insurgent occupation of 
the cities.  RAND Corporation’s Christine Fair provides insight on the restrictions that 
LeT has experienced with urban insurgency in the Kashmir. She states:  
Another concurrent factor contributing to this movement to the rural 
terrain is the increasing presence of “guest militants” from Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Arab countries, and elsewhere. These infiltrators have 
become more prominent in the insurgency from the early 1990s onward. 
They do not speak Kashmiri and have different habits of dress and 
appearance, thus they do not blend in with the Kashmiri population … 
consequently they find it easier to operate in more isolated areas than in 
Srinagar, where they may be easily identified and targeted.126  
5. Invisibility 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and its assault on Mumbai in 2008 exemplify an insurgency that 
only needs to remain invisible until the conduct of its attacks.  By occupying terrain that 
remains outside the military or political will of its adversary, the organization can operate 
freely without fear of attack.127  Here the LeT enjoyed relative freedom to plan, train and 
rehearse the execution of its attack in Mumbai, only leaving a sliver of its members 
vulnerable during the execution.  U.S., British and Indian intelligence reportedly 
compromised elements of Zarrar Shah’s electronic signature, but due to his geographic 
location and an inability to properly coordinate between government agencies, the 
operation went forward unimpeded.128     
E. SUMMARY-RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mumbai’s urban environment is not suitable for long-term basing by armed 
insurgents.  Although organized crime runs rampant throughout the city, the stark 
difference in criminal tactics and desired end state when compared to the LeT, make the 
latter less suitable for persistent armed occupation.  Urban elements however may 
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continue to support limited duration, high profile attacks or non-violent supporting efforts 
in the form of financial support or reconnaissance elements.   
The 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba attack in Mumbai was not an example of a growing 
urban insurgency, but rather the sign of a rural insurgency that exploited vulnerabilities of 
the urban terrain to support a high profile attack.  The root of the insurgency was not 
directly associated to the complexity of Mumbai or even the exploitable attributes of its 
slums.  The attack does demonstrate however, that the urban terrain remains vulnerable to 
attack by its adversaries.   
This reveals a predicament for the state. With resources always being a limiting 
factor, the state must decide whether to focus assets toward securing the megacity, taking 
a fortress like mentality, or extend resources into the rural environment in pursuit of 
insurgent safe havens.   
In the first scenario the state will surrender the rural areas to the insurgency, allow 
for its continued growth and likely face a more persistent and capable threat in the future. 
This was evident in Afghanistan where at times the pulse of the nation was taken by the 
level of security in its provincial capitals. Overtime however and in sequence with 
growing urban defense initiatives the threat continued to rise.  In 2012, the primary focus 
of many security forces was to identify and interdict what was termed “massive vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices,” a threat that was developed to overcome the 
fortress like nature of many coalition bases. The insurgents in this case, originating in the 
rural environment, continued to develop means to circumvent urban security 
infrastructure, eventually finding success as seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan.129      
In the second scenario, where the state chooses to pursue the insurgency in its safe 
havens, the state may accept a level of exposure in the city. However, it stands a chance 
to eliminate or reduce insurgent growth while keeping its adversary displaced in the rural 
environment.   
                                                 
129 Iraq: 250Kilogram bomb enters Bagdad circumventing multiple checkpoints and kills over 250 
people.   http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=2511908&language=en; Afghanistan: Afghan 
Taliban kill at least 28 in major attack in central Kabul.   http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-
blast-idUSKCN0XG0BO.  
 38 
Last, the same economic prosperity that created Mumbai also allowed for the 
creation of a sufficient internal security apparatus.  Although India faces insurgent 
opposition throughout its rural areas, specifically the Kashmir region, its internal security 
elements have proven adequate for thwarting long-term insurgent occupation of the urban 
terrain.  In light of this, India’s future counterinsurgency strategy against LeT will likely 
occur in the rural areas of the Kashmir and in the political arena rather than the streets of 
Mumbai. 
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VI. CASE STUDY #3—NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, 
ALGIERS, ALGERIA  
The Algerian war of 1954 to 1962 is often studied for instances of urban combat, 
specifically the Battle of Algiers.  The insurgency within the city was only a portion of 
the overall insurrection.  The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) also relied heavily on 
third-party sponsors and rural populations in Algeria’s ungoverned border regions for 
their growth, organization and resupply.   
After being driven out of rural Algeria, the FLN changed its insurgent strategy 
and sourced operations from the urban environment, specifically the densely populated 
Muslim quarter of Algiers known as the Casbah.  Although favorable demographics and 
the physical dynamics of the Casbah allowed the FLN an opportunity to reorganize, upon 
recognition, French counterinsurgency operations quickly stunted the FLN’s urban 
initiative.   
A. URBAN ALGERIA 
The growth of cities in Algeria from the 1920s to the 1950s closely resembles the 
rapid growth of today’s megacity.  Over the course of thirty years, the urban population 
in Algeria doubled as impoverished rural peoples fled to urban environments in hopes of 
capitalizing on their commercial growth.130  The late Professor John Ruedy of 
Georgetown University described the friction caused when rural peasants began moving 
into the city, a place that had been previously dominated by French and European 
colonists.  He stated that “physical proximity within a framework of institutionalized 
inequality only heightened intercommunal tensions.”131   
With friction growing between urban inhabitants, the Muslim population 
overcrowded its own sections of the city, particularly the Casbah.  Author John Talbott 
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described the Casbah in 1952 as “one of the most populated slums in the world.”132  
Although French General Paul Aussaresses described the Casbah as “an old town made 
up of a series of narrow streets laid out as a maze, where houses all had inner courtyards 
and terraces offering the rebels ideal places to hide and operate,” it served as the eventual 
location of the FLN’s tactical defeat.133     
B. NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
The Front de Libération Nationale can be traced back to the Parti Communiste 
Algérien (PCA) which was created in 1935.134  Following the arrest of most of its 
leadership, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratique (MTLD) was 
formed, but also struggled to properly address Algerian grievances.135  In 1954 due to 
continued quarrels amongst the party, the FLN emerged as a unifying organization, 
establishing both interior and exterior delegations with the shared intent of ousting its 
French colonizers and establishing an Islamic state.136  
1. Insurgent Strategy  
Throughout the war in Algeria, the FLN altered its insurgent strategy based on its 
Parti Communiste Algérien roots, FLN sponsors and changing French tactics.  During the 
initial phases of the insurgency, the FLN’s insurgent strategy closely conformed to 
Galula’s “Orthodox Pattern” or “Communist approach.”137  Communism seemed 
intertwined into most conflicts of the era, and British historian Martin Thomas highlights 
evidence of it within the FLN as well.  He stated that “Algerian nationalists based in 
France implemented the organizational example of the French Communist Party (PCF) 
                                                 
132 John E. Talbott, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954–1962 (New York: Knopf, 
1980), 79. 
133 Paul Aussaresses and Robert L. Miller, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-
terrorism in Algeria 1955–1957 (New York: Enigma, 2005), 64. 
134 Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962 
(Stanford, Ca. : Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 6. 
135 Ibid., 6. 
136 Ibid., 8–9.  
137 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 30. 
 41 
and [used] the vocabulary of working class radicalism.”138  The FLN successfully created 
a nationalist political party, established a mass base of rural support and as Galula 
suggests, began organization “into both open and clandestine apparatuses.”139  Ruedy 
describes the thoroughness of preparation conducted by the FLN, leveraging a long 
history of growing insurrection amongst the native Algerians and their French colonizers.  
He noted “8,500,000 people do not simultaneously initiate any enterprise … rebels 
managed progressively to rally layer after layer of Algerian society, starting with 
disillusioned small-town youth and impoverished peasants and ending up eventually with 
most of the privileged urbanites.”140    
However, once the French identified a significant build-up of anti-colonial 
guerrillas in the rural environment, the French altered their tactics.  French forces, 
learning from their recent struggles in Vietnam, fenced off the Algerian borders and 
divided the countryside into small sectors called quadrillage.  In order to cut off supplies 
from the guerrillas, they began resettlement of rural families to areas outside of FLN 
control.141  With this system in place, the French temporarily subdued the rural 
insurgency, forcing the FLN toward the cities.   
Seeking safe haven in the urban environment, the FLN was short on supplies and 
continued to struggle with organization. It was forced to change its insurgent strategy to 
reflect more of a “Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern.”142  The FLN hoped that the use of 
terrorist tactics would accelerate their movement and increase international awareness.     
2. Adequacy of Infrastructure and Operational Access  
The Front de Libération Nationale’s support infrastructure extended well beyond 
the city of Algiers.  Early in the war the FLN and its armed component, the Armée de 
Libération Nationale (ALN) exploited the ungoverned nature of the rural environment 
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and used infrastructure created by French colonists in the 1830’s to travel to Morocco and 
Tunisia for training and resupply.143   
In addition to using existing transportation infrastructure to facilitate movement to 
training venues, the roads and railways transiting the rural areas allowed almost 
unimpeded access to arms early in the war.  Here the FLN seized on Communist support 
as they received weapons, funding and personnel from Communist Czechoslovakia and 
East Germany.144  World War II veteran and historian, Colonel Virgil Ney points out that 
in 1958, even after three years of fighting, the French estimated that the ALN was 
receiving up to 2,000 weapons per month from Morocco and Tunisia.145  Overly focused 
on occupation of the urban terrain, the French were only able to capture approximately 
400 each month.146   
Throughout the war, the FLN maintained access to its desired attack objectives by 
altering its movement techniques based on observation of French tactics.  Although the 
French initiated strict population control measures such as checkpoints and curfews, the 
FLN began using women, who were often free to move about unimpeded.  However, 
these women were not typically trained in the city as the rural environment provided a 
much better safe haven.  Writer and revolutionary Frantz Fanon describes in his 1965 
book, A Dying Colonialism, that women would often times leave their families behind 
and head to the mountains for months at a time before returning to a supportive family to 
carry out attacks against the French.147         
Upon shifting to an urban strategy and in an attempt to cripple the French will to 
maintain Algeria as a colony, Ben M’Hidi, the FLN leader at the time, increased terrorist-
style attacks, deeming every European colonist a potential target.148  With these orders, 
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the FLN embraced the “short-cut pattern” conducting indiscriminate bombing of military, 
police and civilian establishments alike.149  
The ALN launched these attacks from the Casbah, the Muslim quarter of the city 
of Algiers. In May of 1956, a reporter from the Chicago Daily Tribune described the 
Casbah as “an area of twisting, narrow streets, crumbling houses and dark patios…today 
the Casbah is jammed with throngs of white clad veiled women and men in robes or 
shabby western dress. Outdoor markets are squeezed into the streets, some so narrow two 
persons can hardly walk abreast.”150  The description provided sounds as if the Casbah of 
1956 resembled modern day megacity slums.  While this complex terrain initially 
allowed for an urban base of operations, the French leveraged this against the FLN, 
which enabled them to tactically defeat the insurgents.  
3. Availability of Income 
Maintaining both rural and urban bases for their insurgency, the FLN received 
funding from a variety of sources.  Critical to the FLN’s continued operations was aid 
from Tunisia and Egypt, who provided both financial and material support.151  In 
addition to and amongst other more direct finance methods, Galula notes more 
inconspicuous methods were also used, stating that “Red China shipped tea to the FLN in 
Morocco, where it was sold on the open market” and used to fund the insurgency.152  
In addition to the FLN’s taxation of local Algerians, which netted approximately 
$300,000 dollars annually, Algerian workers residing in France provided significant 
funds to the FLN, by some estimates up to USD $900,000 annually.153 The FLN’s 
success, although often misconstrued as isolated to support from within the city of 
Algiers, was heavily reliant on funding supplied by both emigrants and third-party 
sponsors.   
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4. Favorable Demographics  
Demographics played a crucial role for the FLN in Algeria. While Europeans 
dominated urban Algeria in the early 1900s, the urban Muslim population began to swell 
in the years leading up to the revolution.  By 1954, Muslims made up 63% of the urban 
population and maintained 97% of the rural population.154  This gave the FLN a 
significant population of ethnic Algerians with shared Muslim faith and common political 
grievances to recruit from.  Given the demographic favor, the FLN rallied support from 
the large, poor, rural populations before shifting its focus toward the urban environment.   
Upon moving into the city of Algiers and prior to being wiped out there by the 
French, the FLN had a reliable base of support in the Casbah.  With a Muslim population 
there exceeding eighty thousand, the FLN maintained approximately 5,000 members, 150 
being hard-core terrorists.155  French tactics initially only strengthened support for the 
FLN.  Ruedy stated that “even when it did not indiscriminately target the innocent, 
tended for every authentic revolutionary it killed or imprisoned to multiply the alienation 
factor by turning that person’s family and friends into revolutionaries.”156     
5. Invisibility    
Initially, favorable demographics coupled with the maze-like nature of the Casbah 
provided a sufficient level of invisibility for the FLN.  This allowed ALN guerrillas to 
successfully navigate to desired targets, conduct the attack and slip back into the crowded 
warrens that made up the Casbah.  However, upon breaking the threshold of violence, the 
same factors that provided FLN guerrillas with invisibility throughout the city, left them 
vulnerable to French counterinsurgents.  The French 10th Parachute Regiment used the 
grid like layout of the city, cordoned the Casbah and conducted heavy handed population 
control measures to highlight FLN activity for French action.157  In essence, the 
infrastructure and favorable demographics still existed, but as Professor Gordon 
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McCormick would suggest, the FLN was no longer invisible and could easily be affected 
by French forces.   
In addition to the negative physical attributes of the Casbah, the dense population 
that existed within Algiers provided the French with a significant number of Algerian 
informants. Chairman of international relations at St. Joseph’s University, Anthony Joes 
assessed in his book Urban Guerrilla Warfare, that “it was not difficult to find Muslims 
willing to work against the FLN”158  The French simply detained and interrogated any 
person whom they suspected of having valuable information.159  With a wealth of 
information coming in, the French pieced together the insurgent network and began 
disassembling the FLN’s urban infrastructure.  John Talbott, Professor at the University 
of California at Santa Barbara observed that “by such methods, the paratroops deprived 
the secret organization of its secrets.  They forced the terrorists on the run, discovered 
their caches of bombs and guns, disrupted the flow of money and supplies, discouraged 
recruitment, reduced and then nearly eliminated bombings, shootings, and stabbings that 
had brought them to the city.”160  
With nowhere for the FLN to hide or reconsolidate, the French operations, while 
often brutal, defeated the FLN in the city.  Professor Joes claims that “it is a textbook 
case of what happens when would-be guerrillas systematically violate the advice and 
example of Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung regarding how to wage guerrilla war.”161      
C. CONCLUSION 
Although many of the elements required for insurgent occupation of the urban 
environment existed, the FLN did not choose the city exclusively for its base of 
operations.  The FLN systematically grew the insurgency in the rural environment, across 
international borders and across a range of economic classes. The FLN only shifted to an 
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urban, “bourgeois pattern” insurgency out of necessity, which ultimately led to the 
organizations tactical defeat.   
The dynamics of the urban environment, specifically those of the Casbah (which 
can be compared to those of the modern day megacity slum) only temporarily supported a 
safe haven for armed insurgents.  The element of invisibility proved extremely difficult 
for the FLN as the dense population of Algiers coupled with the grid like layout of the 
city, allowed for sufficient intelligence collection, effective targeting and overall 
successful counterinsurgent operations.  Given these conditions and immediately after 
breaking the French’s allowed threshold of violence, French Paratroopers tactically 
defeated the urban based FLN in less than a year. 
The counter-argument is one however that suggests that the FLN successfully 
used the urban environment to publicize the brutal tactics used by the French, to build 
international disapproval for colonial regimes.  The contrarian can argue that in the case 
of Algiers, the urban environment was critical to the FLN’s strategic success.  While this 
argument may be valid when studying insurgent strategic planning or international 
messaging, the focus of this research is to determine if the environment itself was 
suitable.  This argument does illuminate however, that operations in the urban 
environment may garner increased scrutiny from the international community than those 
same operations conducted in the rural areas.  Understanding this, the French could have 
limited its brutal interrogation techniques and in the modern era, used a variety of other 
intelligence collection efforts in order to better appeal to the international community.  
While Algiers of the 1950s lacked the level of technology seen in today’s 
megacity environment, it shares many of the difficulties seen today by insurgents in their 
attempts to occupy urban terrain.  The case reinforces that overpopulation and urban 
slums are of no late creation, but an environment that has been tested by insurgents for 
decades.  Even given the significant demographic advantage, insurgents struggled to hold 
the urban ground in competition with the occupying power. 
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VII. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
A. FINDINGS 
The goal of this study has been to assess whether villages still matter in the face 
of global urbanization.  For this purpose, research on the current trends in global 
urbanization weighed the benefits and drawbacks of megacity growth.  Three case studies 
covered a wide geographic range, with the contemporary cases in areas with some of the 
highest rates of urbanization.  While the historic case also broadened the geographic 
scope of the study, it also provided insights on how each variable influenced success or 
failure once the insurgency was introduced in the urban environment.  
Arguing that demographic shifts in the world’s population combined with the 
poor conditions generated by megacity growth will create the next counterinsurgency 
environment may still remain an unproven hypothesis.  In 2016, 34 megacities existed.  
Tokyo, Manila, Mumbai, Shanghai and New York City all topped the charts as some of 
the largest megacities in the world, but none of them appear to be collapsing in 
competition with armed urban insurgents.  Evidence suggests that insurgencies operating 
in these regions, specifically Mumbai and Manila are showing little sign of attempting 
exclusive armed occupation of these urban areas and instead have continued to 
demonstrate reliance on the rural regions as their primary safe havens.  Both the 
Communist People’s Party-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) in the Philippines as well as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan rely heavily on the rural mountainous regions for 
sanctuary and only appear to use their respective megacities for finance operations, the 
promotion of non-violent political entities or to garner support through acts of terror.  
These acts of terror however, appear to be temporary in nature as the state security 
apparatus has proven capable of pushing guerrillas out of the megacity, back into their 
rural bases.  This suggests that the megacities may remain a prime target for high profile 
attacks, but the insurgents will likely maintain the rural villages as their primary safe 
haven.   
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Given the cases researched, evidence has revealed that the CPP-NPA as well as 
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria both attempted urban-based 
insurgencies, but were faced with structural challenges that led to their tactical defeat or 
withdrawal back to the rural environment.  During their attempts to occupy the urban 
terrain, multiple factors stood out as barriers to their success.  First, the same economic 
prosperity that created the megacities appears to have also created a sufficient security 
apparatus capable of eliminating persistent armed insurgent presence.  Given the state’s 
ability to react, the physical organization of the megacity combined with the complex 
social structure of the slums improved counterinsurgent intelligence collection efforts as 
well as their ability to cordon off and clear areas of concern.  In India, foreign fighters are 
withdrawing from the urban terrain and seeking safe haven in the neighboring mountains 
because of their inability to blend in with the local urban inhabitants.  With cultural 
indicators illuminating their presence and a dense population of potential police 
informants, these guerrillas find the rural environment less vulnerable for persistent 
armed occupation.  In addition and although improved cellular communication may assist 
in insurgent coordination in less developed regions, other evidence suggests that within 
the urban environment, these technologies may serve as a greater advantage to the state, 
increasing the vulnerabilities and potential costs to urban insurgents.         
In addition to the structural barriers to insurgent occupation, urban-rural 
polarization may continue to increase as megacities rise in relative state power and focus 
economic gain toward urban initiatives.  As Manila continues to grow, the state may get 
the sense that the benefits of urban investment outweigh that of the rural.  The CPP-NPA 
continues to capitalize on this polarization, exploiting increased levels of perceived 
relative deprivation, further acquiring rural recruits mostly without the need for 
intimidation.  This increasing polarization can be observed within the nations GDP as 
well.  Manila alone provides 37.2% toward the Philippine GDP, while rural mining only 
provides 2.8%.  Maintenance and security of the megacity in this case may instinctively 
serve as more appealing to the state than the less prosperous rural environment.  The 
2.8% from the countryside, however, provides the CPP-NPA with over 5.4 million USD 
per year in revolutionary taxes, making the rural terrain a less contested or vulnerable 
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location for unimpeded and fortuitous reorganization.  Further evidence exists in China, 
the current megacity leader, who has implemented control measures to block rural 
migration into the cities.  These measures coupled with a decrease in rural access to 
education and government services are causing further polarization, creating a large 
population of disenfranchised rural citizens.  These populations serve as potential recruits 
for growing rural insurgencies. 
Last, the Lashkar-e-Taiba case highlights a predicament that may resonate for 
other nations as well.  India faces two types of insurgent threats: a series of internal, 
Maoist type insurgencies, and LeT, who remains outside the state’s military and political 
reach.  Some would argue that in this case, India, specifically Mumbai, should take a 
fortress-like approach and focus its security resources on the urban environment in 
attempt to prevent insurgents from conducting high profile attacks, and cede the rural 
environment to those who wish to occupy it.  In essence, their efforts would not attack the 
rear echelons of the insurgency, but protect its citizens on the “front lines.”  This 
approach may be insufficient however, leaving the threat unchecked in the rural 
environment where they will continue to grow, serving as a persistent threat which will 
inevitably challenge the state’s authority.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
As military planners and strategists prepare for future conflict, a balance should 
be drawn between urban and rural counterinsurgent capabilities.  A recent fascination 
with megacity growth has assumed that urban attacks equate to urban insurgency, while 
trends suggest that insurgents continue to prefer the rural environment as their safe 
havens.  A nation should not believe that the security of its capital reflects the security of 
the entire nation.  In the cases researched, the detonation of a bomb in a megacity did not 
necessarily equate to the emergence of an urban insurgency, but rather the mobilization 
of one that grew unimpeded in a rural environment.  
The United States military will face urban combat challenges and therefore must 
be prepared for the task.  However, planners must decide when it will be necessary to 
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pursue the enemy in their rural safe havens or risk the second and third-order effects 
associated with militarization of the urban environment.   
The U.S. Armed Forces should continue its partnership with allied security forces, 
emphasizing access to the rural environment and the extension of government resources 
to those living outside the megacity.  Improving national infrastructure and making 
megacity prosperity inclusive to the remainder of the state may reduce perceived relative 
deprivation and improve urban-rural relationships.  Although focused development of the 
megacity may appear to have greater benefits to the state, rural inclusion may also pay 
long-term security dividends.     
This thesis does not suggest that megacities are free of vulnerabilities or do not 
present significant security concerns. Rather, this thesis suggests that a balanced 
approach to urban and rural counterinsurgency will be required in the future.  With 
insurgents clearly exploiting the benefits of both environments an over intoxication with 
megacity military operations may leave the hinterlands more vulnerable to insurgent 
occupation.  Critical toward United States counterinsurgency strategy is maintaining the 
ability to operate in, influence and mobilize rural populations.  If in tomorrow’s conflict 
we choose to take the fight to the where the insurgent seeks refuge, it will likely occur in 
the mountains, jungles and deserts for control of the villages.  
C. AREAS FOR CONTINUED RESEARCH       
This research only presented three major examples of how insurgents operated in 
relation to existing megacities.  Given that there are 34 megacities today and statistics on 
the growth of megacities is readily available, quantitative research could be conducted to 
classify the number of historical urban or rural based insurgencies in relation to the 
number of existing megacities. This could be compared to present-day statistics in order 
to determine if insurgent organizations are trending toward urban bases or if insurgents 
have and/or will continue to use rural areas as their primary safe havens. 
This research did not produce evidence of an insurgency that has chosen a 
megacity or its slums as a primary safe haven or source of support.  Further research 
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could be conducted which may show this, and suggest under which conditions the 
megacity would be best suitable for insurgent occupation.   
D. AUTHOR’S CLOSING NOTE 
At the beginning of this research and during the initial examination of my 
question “do villages still matter in counterinsurgency,” it seemed to me that the answer 
would be “no.”  After departing from the rural-based “Village Stability Operations” 
model used by Special Operations in Afghanistan, the aforementioned fascination with 
megacities continued to emerge and generated numerous reports, articles and books, most 
notably David Kilcullen’s Out of the Mountains.  Kilcullen’s book along with other 
contemporary publications correctly highlighted statistics and data illuminating the global 
demographic shifts of populations from rural to urban areas.  However, those authors 
assumed that insurgents would move with those populations into cities and in accordance 
with Mao Zedong’s famous observation that “the people are the sea in which, like fish, 
insurgents swim.”162  But my study of insurgent operations in three major cases showed 
that Mao’s dictum, based on his experience leading a rural-based insurgency, did not 
readily transfer from the countryside to megacities.  This discovery was a surprise to me.  
As I note in my conclusion, there is still much research that can and should be done on 
the phenomenon of 21st-century insurgency.  However, the cases described here plainly 
disprove the presumption that future guerillas and revolutionaries will abandon the 
hinterlands to base their operations in the slums and ghettos of cities and megacities.  
This means that in combatting or instigating an insurgency, villages will still matter.  This 
also means it will be important for special operations forces to know how to traverse the 
forests, navigate the swamps, cross the desserts—and go into the mountains.  As long as 
there are hinterlands, the insurgents will still be there, for years to come.                    
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